Distributed agreement-based algorithms are often specified in a crash-stop asynchronous model augmented by Chandra and Toueg's unreliable failure detectors. In such models, correct nodes stay up forever, incorrect nodes eventually crash and remain down forever, and failure detectors behave correctly forever eventually, However, in reality, nodes as well as communication links both crash and recover without deterministic guarantees to remain in some state forever.
Introduction
Distributed systems comprise multiple software and hardware components that are bound to eventually fail [10] . Such failures can cause service malfunction or unavailability, incurring significant costs to mission-critical systems, e.g., automation systems and on-line transactions. The failures' impact can be minimized by protocols that let systems agree on values and actions despite failures. As a consequence, many variants of the agreement or the consensus problem [29] under different assumptions have been studied. Of particular importance are synchrony and failure model assumptions, as they determine the problem's complexity.
In the simplest failure model, often called the crash-stop model, a process fails by stopping to execute its protocol and never recovers. In an asynchronous system, i.e., a system without bounds on execution delays or message latency, assuming the crash-stop failure model, makes it impossible to distinguish a crashed from a very slow process. This renders consensus-like problems unsolvable deterministically [16] , already in this very simple failure model. To circumvent this impossibility, previous works have investigated ways to relax the underlying asynchrony assumption either explicitly, e.g., by using partial synchrony [12] , or implicitly, by defining oracles that encapsulate time, e.g., failure detectors [8] . The result is a large and rich body of literature that builds on top of the former and latter techniques to solve consensus-like problems in the presence of crash-stop failures. Typically, the respective proofs rely on assumptions of the "eventually forever" form: the correct nodes staying up forever, incorrect nodes eventually crashing and remaining down forever, and failure detectors producing wrong output in the beginning, but eventually providing correct results forever.
However, such "eventually forever" assumptions are not met by real distributed systems. In reality, processes may crash but their processors reboot, and the recovered process rejoins the computation. Communication might also fail at any point in time, but get restored later. Hence, the failure and recovery modes of processes as well as communication links are in reality probabilistic and temporary [13, 15, 31] , especially in systems incorporating many unreliable off-the-shelf low-cost devices and communication technologies. This led to the development of crash-recovery models, where processes repeatedly leave and join the computation unannounced. This requires new failure detector definitions and new consensus algorithms built on top of these failure detectors [1, 24, 11, 21 ] as well as completely new solutions (without failure detectors) that consider different classes of failures, namely classified according to how many times a process can crash and recover [25] . However, such solutions eliminate the "eventually forever" assumptions only on the processes' level and not for the communication and failure detectors. Moreover, they do not tell us whether crash-stop algorithms can be "ported unchanged" to crash-recovery settings.
To this end, this paper investigates how to re-use consensus algorithms defined for the crash-stop model with reliable links and failure detectors in a more realistic crash-recovery model, where processes and links can crash and recover probabilistically and for an unbounded number of times. Our models allow unstable nodes, i.e., nodes that fail and recover infinitely often. These are often excluded or limited in number in other models. In contrast, we explicitly allow unstable behavior of any number of processes and links, by modeling communication problems and crash-recovery behaviors as probabilistic and temporary, rather than deterministic and perpetual. Our system model, similar to existing models that rely on probabilistic factors, e.g., coin flips, comes with the trade-off of solving consensus (namely the termination property), with probability 1, rather than deterministically.
However, unlike existing solutions that incorporate probabilistic behavior, our approach does not aim at inventing new consensus algorithms but rather focuses on using existing deterministic ones to solve consensus with probability 1. Our approach is modular: we build a wrapper that interacts with a crash-stop algorithm as a black box, exchanges messages with other wrappers and transforms these messages into messages that the crash-stop algorithm understands. We then formally define classes of algorithms and safety properties for which we prove that our wrapper constructs a system that preserves these properties. Additionally, we show that termination with probability 1 is guaranteed for wrapped algorithms of this class. Moreover, this class is wide and includes the celebrated Chandra-Toueg algorithm [8] as well as the instantiation of the indulgent framework with failure detectors from [20] . Our work allows such algorithms to be ported unchanged to our crash-recovery model. Hence applications built on top of such algorithms can run in real systems with crash-recovery behavior by simply using our wrapper.
Contributions:
To summarize, our main contributions are:
New system models that capture probabilistic and temporary failures and recoveries of processes and communication links in real distributed systems (described in Section 3) A wrapper framework that allows a wide class of crash-stop consensus algorithms to be used unchanged in our more realistic models (described in Section 4) Formal properties describing which crash-stop consensus algorithms benefit from our framework and hence can be reused to solve consensus in crash-recovery settings (de-previously proposed failure detectors for the crash-recovery setting have anomalous behaviors even in synchronous systems when considering unstable processes, i.e., processes that crash and recover infinitely often. The authors propose new failure detectors to mitigate this drawback. They also determine the necessary conditions regarding stable storage that allow consensus to be solved in the crash-recovery model, and provide two efficient consensus algorithms: one with, and one without using stable storage. Unlike [1] , we do not exclude unstable processes from implementing consensus, thus our model tolerates a wider variety of node behavior. Furthermore, our wrapper requires no modifications to the existing crashstop consensus algorithms, as it treats them as black-boxes.
Modular Crash-Recovery Approaches: Similar to [1] , Freiling et al.
[18] investigate the solvability of consensus in the crash-recovery model under varying assumptions, regarding the number of unstable and correct processes and what is persisted in stable storage. They reuse existing algorithms from the crash-stop model in a modular way (without changing them) or semi-modular way, with some modifications to the algorithm (as in the case of [8] ). Similar to our work, they provide algorithms to emulate a crash-stop system on top of a crash-recovery system. Our work, however, always reuses algorithms in a fully modular way, and we define a wide class of algorithms for which such reuse is possible. Furthermore, as we model message losses, processes crashes, and process recoveries probabilistically, our results also apply if processes are unstable, i.e., crash and recover infinitely often.
Randomized Consensus Algorithms: Besides the literature that studied deterministic consensus algorithms, existing works have also explored randomized algorithms to solve "consensus with probability 1". These include, for example, techniques based on using random coin-flips [2, 5, 17] or probabilistic schedulers [7] . In systems with dynamic communication failures, multiple randomized algorithms [27, 26] addressed the k-consensus problem, which requires only k processes to eventually decide. Moniz et al.
[27] considered a system with correct processes and a bound on the number of faulty transmission. In a wireless setting, where multiple processes share a communication channel, Moniz et al. [26] devise an algorithm tolerating up to f Byzantine processes and requires a bound on the number of omission faults affecting correct processes. In comparison, our work in this paper does not use randomization in the algorithm itself: we focus on using existing deterministic algorithms to solve consensus (with probability 1) in networks with probabilistic failure and recovery patterns of processes and links.
System Models
We start with defining the notation we use, and then define general concepts common to all of our models. Then, we define each of our models in turn. Notation: Given a set S, we define S ⊥ to be the set S ∪ {⊥}, where ⊥ is a distinguished element not present in S. The set of finite sequences over a set S is denoted by S * . We also call sequences words, when customary. The empty sequence is denoted by []. Given a non-empty sequence, head defines its first element, tail the remainder of the sequence, and, if the sequence is finite, last its last element. Given two sequences u and v, where u is finite, u · v denotes their concatenation. For a word u, |u| denotes the length of u. Letting u(i) be the i-th letter of u, we say that u is a subword of v if there exists a strictly monotone function f : N → N such that u(i) = v(f (i)), for 1 ≤ i ≤ |u| if u is finite, and for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . .} if u is infinite. Analogously, v is a superword of u.
We denote the space of partial functions between sets A and B by A B. Note that
. Given any function f : A B, its graph, written Γ(f ), is the relation XX:5
The range of f , written ran(f ), is the set {y | (x, y) ∈ Γ(f )}.
Common concepts:
We consider a fixed finite set of processes Π = {1 . . . N }, and a fixed countable set of values, denoted V. For each algorithm there is an algorithm-specific countable set of local states Σ p , for each process p ∈ Π. For simplicity, we restrict ourselves to algorithms where Σ p = Σ q , ∀p, q ∈ Π. Note that this does not exclude algorithms that take decisions based on identifiers. We define the global state space Σ = p∈Π Σ p . Given a s ∈ Σ, we define s p ∈ Σ p as the projection of s to its p-th component.
A property over an alphabet A is a set of infinite words over A. We use standard definitions of liveness and safety properties [4] . A property P is a safety property if, for every infinite word w / ∈ P , there exists a finite prefix u of w such that the concatenation u · v / ∈ P for all infinite words v. Intuitively, the prefix u is "bad" and not recoverable from. A property P is a liveness property if for any finite word u there exists an infinite word v such that u · v ∈ P . Intuitively, "good" things can always happen later.
In this paper, we are interested in preserving properties over the alphabet Σ between the crash-stop and crash-recovery versions of an algorithm. In particular, we assume that the local states Σ p are records, with two distinguished fields: inp of type V and dec of type V ⊥ . Intuitively, a dec value of ⊥ indicates that the process has not decided yet. For an infinite word w over the alphabet Σ, let w(i, p) denote the local state of the process p at the i-th letter of the word. Let us state the standard safety properties of consensus in our notation.
Validity. Decided values must come from the set of input values. Formally, validity describes the set of words w such that
Processes do not change their decisions. Formally, integrity describes the set of words w such that
To simplify our preservation results for safety properties, our models store information about process failures separately from Σ. As a consequence, the standard crash-stop termination property cannot be expressed as a property over Σ: it is conditioned on a process not failing. However, we do not directly use the crash-stop notion of termination and we omit this definition here. Instead, we will prove the following property for the algorithms in our probabilistic crash-recovery model:
Probabilistic crash-recovery termination. With probability 1, all processes eventually decide.
The crash-stop model
Our definition of the crash-stop model is standard and closely follows [8] . We assume an asynchronous environment, with processes taking steps in an interleaved fashion. Processes communicate using reliable links, and can query failure detectors. Failure detectors: A failure pattern fp is an infinite word over the alphabet 2 Π . Intuitively, each letter is the set of failed processes in a transition step of a run of a transition system. A failure detector with range R is a function from failure patterns to properties over the alphabet R. 
Intuitively, given zero or one messages received from some other processes and an output of the failure detector, a step maps the current process state to a new state, and maps the new state to a set of messages to be sent, with zero or one messages sent to each process. A crash-stop algorithm A over Σ, M and R is a tuple (I, step, D, N f ) where: I ⊆ Σ is the finite set of initial states, step ∈ CSS(M, R) is the step function, and D ∈ F D(R) is a failure detector. N f < N is the resilience condition, i.e., the number of failures tolerated by the algorithm (recall that we consider a fixed N ). We refer to the components of an algorithm A by A.I, A.step, A.D and A.N f . As I is finite, it will admit a uniform distribution in our probabilistic model in Section 3.3.
Configurations:
As noted earlier, we focus on preserving properties over Σ between crashstop and crash-recovery models. However, Σ contains insufficient information to model the algorithm's crash-stop executions (runs). In particular, to account for (1) asynchronous message delivery and (2) process failures, we must extend states to configurations. A crashstop configuration is a triple (s, M, F ) where: s ∈ Σ is the (global) state, M ⊆ Π×Π×M is the set of in-flight messages, where (p, q, m) ∈ M represents a message m that was sent to p by q. For simplicity, M is a set, i.e., we assume that each message is sent at most once between any pair of processes during the entire execution of the algorithm. This suffices for round-based algorithms that tag messages with their round numbers, and exchange messages once per round. F ⊆ Π is the set of failed processes. As with algorithms, we refer to the components of a configuration c by c.s, c.M and c.F .
Step labels and transitions: While the algorithm steps are deterministic, the asynchronous transition system is not: any (non-failed) process can take a step at any point in time, with different possible received messages, and different failure detector outputs. Accessing this non-determinism information is useful in proofs, so we extract it as follows. A crash-stop step label is a quadruple (p, rmsg, fails, fdo), where: p ∈ Π is the process taking the step, rmsg ∈ (Π × M) ⊥ is the message p receives in the step (⊥ modeling a missing message), fails ⊆ Π is the set of processes failed at the end of the step, fdo ∈ R is p's output of the failure detector. A crash-stop step of the algorithm A is a triple (c, l, c ), where c and c are configurations and l is a label. Crash-stop steps must satisfy the following properties:
p / ∈ c.F , i.e., p is not failed at the start of the step. With s p and s p denoting process p's state in c and c respectively, s p = next(s p , rmsg, fdo), and s q = s q for q = p. That is, p takes a step according to the label and the algorithm's rules, and the other processes do not move. If rmsg = ⊥, then (p, rmsg) ∈ c.M , i.e., if a message was received, then it was in flight.
where rcvd is {(p, rmsg)} if rmsg = ⊥ and ∅ otherwise. That is, the received message is removed from the set of in-flight messages, and the produced messages are added. There is a failure pattern fp such that the sequence c i .F is a prefix of fp, and the sequence fdo i is a prefix of D(f p). That is, the output of the failure detector satisfies the condition of the failure detector. Such a run has reliable links if, whenever (p, q, m) ∈ c i .M , and p, q / ∈ c j .F for all j, then there exists a k ≥ i such that l k = (p, (q, m), fails, f do) for some fails and fdo. That is, all in-flight messages eventually get delivered, unless the sender or the receiver is faulty. The crash-stop system of the algorithm A is the sequence of all crash-stop runs of A. The crash-stop system with reliable links of the algorithm A is the set of all crash stop runs with reliable links.
As mentioned before, we are interested in properties that are sequences of global states. In this sense, runs contain too much information (e.g., in-flight messages). Thus, given a run ρ, we define its state trace tr(ρ), obtained by removing the labels and projecting configurations onto just the states. We introduce a notion of a state property: an infinite sequence of (global) states. The crash-stop system (with or without reliable links) satisfies a state property P if for every run ρ of the system, tr(ρ) ∈ P . We later show that our crashrecovery wrappers for crash-stop protocols preserve important state properties of crash-stop algorithms. Lastly, we note down some simple properties of crash-stop runs.
Lemma 1 (Reliable links irrelevant for prefixes). Let ρ be a finite crash-stop run of A. Then, ρ can be extended to an infinite crash-stop run of A that has reliable links, by extending tr(ρ) to include infinite message retransmissions for all sent messages.

Summary of time and failure assumptions
Time. Processes are asynchronous and have no notion of time. Links are asynchronous. Failures. Processes can fail by halting forever, while links interconnecting them do not fail.
The lossy synchronous crash-recovery model
We next define our first crash-recovery model. Formally, this a lossy synchronous crashrecovery model, with non-deterministic, but not probabilistic losses, crashes, and recoveries. We use it to prove the preservation of safety properties without taking probabilities into account, since they are not used in such arguments. In this model, we will not distinguish between volatile and persistent memory of a process. Instead, we assume that all memory is persistent. This can be emulated in practice by persisting all volatile memory before taking any actions with side-effects (such as sending network messages). Finally, while the model is formally synchronous, in that all processes take steps simultaneously, it also captures processing delays, as a slow process behaves like a process that crashes and later recovers. Algorithms and algorithm steps: A crash-recovery step over a message space M, written CRS(M) is defined as:
In other words, a step determines the new state based on the current state and the set of received messages. Given the new state, a process sends a message to every other processes (including itself). Compared to the asynchronous setting (Section 3.1), in this model: 1. A process can receive multiple messages simultaneously (rather than receiving at most one message in a step). 2. Every process sends a message to every other process at each step. We use this in later sections to send heartbeat messages, if there is nothing else to exchange. We do not require any guarantees on the delivery of the sent messages in this model.
3.
No failure detector oracle is specified. The synchrony assumption of this model inherently provides spurious failure detection: each process can suspect all peers it did not hear from in the last message exchange. This is in fact exactly what we will use to provide failure detector outputs to the "wrapped" crash-stop algorithms run in this setting 2 . A crash-recovery algorithm A R over Σ, M is a pair (I, step) where: I ⊆ Σ is a finite set of initial states, and step ∈ CRS(M) is the step function. Configurations: As in the crash-stop case, we require more than just the global states to model algorithm executions; we hence introduce configurations. These, however, differ from those for the crash-stop setting. As communication is synchronous, we need not store the inflight messages; they are either delivered by the end of a step, or they are gone. Furthermore, as processes take steps synchronously, we can introduce a global step number.
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A crash-recovery configuration is a tuple (n, s, F ) where n ∈ N is the step number, s ∈ Σ is the (global) state, F ⊆ Π is the set of failed processes. We denote the set of all crash-recovery configurations by C R . Note that this set is countable. This will allow us to impose a Markov chain structure on the system in the later model.
Step labels and transitions: As in the crash-stop setting, we use labels to capture all sources of non-determinism in a step. We will use these labels to assign probabilities to different state transitions in the probabilistic model of the next section.
A crash-recovery step label is a pair (rmsgs, fails), where: rmsgs : Π → (Π M) denotes the message received in the step; rmsgs(p)(q) is the message received by p on the channel from q to p. Note that the function is partial. As we assume that q always attempts to send a message to p, if rmsgs(p)(q) is undefined (rmsgs(p) is a partial function), then either the message on this channel was lost in the step, or the sender q has failed. fails ⊆ Π is the set of processes that are failed at the end of the step. The crash-recovery steps (or transitions) of A, written Tr(A), is the set of all triples (c, l, c ), where, letting l = (rmsgs, fails) and letting s p and s p denote the state of the process p in c and c , we have:
; that is, processes that are up handle their messages. We assume that the state change is atomic; this can be implemented, since we assume that all process memory is persistent. if p ∈ c.F , then s p = s p . Failed processes do not change their state.
if rmsgs(p)(q) is defined, then q / ∈ c.F , and rmsgs(p)(q) = send(s q ). That is, only the sent step messages are received (no message corruption), and messages from failed senders are not received. fails = c .F . Algorithm runs: A finite, resp. infinite crash-recovery run of A is a finite, resp. infinite alternating sequence c 0 , l 0 , c 1 . . . of (crash-recovery) configurations and labels, ending in a configuration if finite, such that: c 0 .s ∈ A.I, i.e., the initial state is allowed by the algorithm (c i , l i , c i+1 ) ∈ Tr(A) for all i, that is, each step is a valid crash-recovery transition of A. The crash-recovery system of algorithm A is the sequence of all crash-recovery runs of A.
Summary of time and failure assumptions
Time. Processes are synchronous and operate in a time-triggered fashion. Links are synchronous (all delivered messages respect a timing upper bound on delivery). Failure. Processes can fail and recover infinitely often. In every time-step, a link can be either crashed or correct. A crashed link drops all sent messages (if any).
The probabilistic crash-recovery model
We now extend the lossy synchronous crash-recovery model to a probabilistic model, where both the successful delivery of messages and failures follow a distribution that can vary with time. A probabilistic network N is a function of type
is the delivery probability for a message sent from p to q at time (step number) t. A probabilistic failure pattern
gives the probability of p being up at time t. 4 Given a crash-recovery algorithm A R , a probabilistic network N and failure pattern F P , a probabilistic crash-recovery system S R (A R , N , F P ) is the Markov chain [6] with: The set of states C R , i.e., the crash-recovery configuration set. The transition probabilities P (c)(c ) defined as P (c) = nf trans (c)·trans(c), where nf trans (c) is the normalization factor for trans(c) and trans(c)(c ) is defined as:
Here, · maps the Boolean values true and false to 1 and 0 respectively. Intuitively, a transition from c to c is only possible if it is possible in the lossy synchronous crashrecovery model. The probability of this transition is calculated by summing over all labels that lead from c to c , and giving each such label a weight. Note that the only non-determinism in the transitions of Tr(A R ) comes exactly from the behavior we deem probabilistic: messages being dropped by the network, and process failures. It is easy to see that nf trans (c) is well defined for all c, as for a fixed configuration c, trans(c)(c ) is non-zero for only finitely many configurations c .
The distribution over the initial states defined by ι = norm(init), where
R .I , and norm normalizes the probabilities. Note that normalization is possible, since we assumed that after fixing N , each algorithm comes with a finite set of initial states.
Summary of time and failure assumptions
Time. Processes are synchronous and operate in a time-triggered fashion. Links are synchronous (all delivered messages respect a timing upper bound on delivery). Failure. Processes and links can fail and recover infinitely often. At the beginning of any time-step a crashed process/link can recover with positive probability and a correct process/link can fail with positive probability.
Important: All our results (Section 4, 5, and 6) hold for both crash-recovery models (Section 3.2 and 3.3 ). However, probabilities are only needed to prove results of Section 6.
Wrapper for Crash-Stop Algorithms
We now define the transformation of a crash-stop algorithm A into a crash-recovery algorithm A R . Intuitively, we do this by (also illustrated in Figure 1 ): Generating a synchronous crash-recovery step using a series of crash-stop steps. Each step in the series handles one individual received message, allowing us to iteratively handle multiple simultaneously incoming messages and bridge the synchrony mismatch between the crash-stop and crash-recovery models. Using round-by-round failure detectors to produce the failure detector outputs to be fed to the crash-stop algorithm. These outputs are from the set 2 Π .
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Providing reliable links, as required by the crash-stop algorithm. During each crashrecovery step, we buffer all outgoing messages of a process, and send them repeatedly in the subsequent crash-recovery steps, until an acknowledgment is received. We first define the message and state spaces of the crash-recovery version A R of a given crash-stop algorithm A as follows:
In A R , we send a pair of messages to each process in each step: the actual payload message (from A), replaced by a special heartbeat message hb being sent when no payload needs to be sent; and an acknowledgment message, confirming the receipt of the last message on the channel in the opposite direction, The local state s p of a process p has three components (st, buff, acks): (1) st stores the state of p in the target crash-stop algorithm; (2) buff represents p's outgoing message buffers, with one buffer for each process (including one for p); and (3) acks(q) records the last message that p received from q. The buffers are LIFO, a choice which proves crucial for our termination proof (Section 6). . These states are listed here separately to intuitively show how the next "real" state to which p will transition is computed. The unfolding also allows to relate traces of A and A R more easily in our proofs, as we produce a crash-stop run from a crash-recovery run when proving properties of the wrapper. The content of p's buffers changes as we progress through the states s i of unfold(p, s, rmsgs) , as the wrapper routes the messages to A and receives new ones from it. The failure detector output (recorded in the labels l i ) remains constant through the unfolding: all processes from whom no message was received in the crash-recovery step are suspected. Finally, the set of failed processes in each label is defined to be empty. We emulate the process recovery that is possible in the crash-recovery model by crash-stop runs in which no processes fail. 
Crash-Recovery Wrapper
Crash-recovery messages and acknowledgements Finally, given a crash-stop algorithm A with an unreliable failure detector and with the per-process state space Σ p , we define its crash-recovery version A R where:
the initial states of A R constitute the set of crashrecovery configurations c such that there exists a crash-stop configuration c s ∈ A.I satisfying the following: (i) the initial states of c and c s correspond to each other and in c all buffers are empty, (ii) no messages are acknowledged, and (iii) the failed processes in c and c s are the same. the next state of a process p is computed by unfolding, based on the messages p received in this round. the message that p sends to a process q pairs the first element of p's (LIFO) buffer for q with the acknowledgment for the last message that p received from q. the execution is short-circuited as soon as a process decides. This is achieved by broadcasting a message to all other processes, announcing that it has decided. When processes receives such a message, they immediately decide and short-circuits their execution. Short-circuiting behavior is a common pattern for consensus algorithms [8, 20] . It can be applied in a black-box way and it is sound for any crash-stop consensus algorithm.
A more formal description of the wrapper can be found in Appendix A. Given a run of crash-recovery version of an algorithm A, we define its state trace, tr(·), as the sequence of configurations obtained by removing the labels, projecting each configuration c onto c.s, and projecting each local state c.s p onto c.s p .st. We overload the function symbol tr(·) to work on both crash-stop and crash-recovery runs. Note that both crash-stop and crash-recovery state properties are sequences of states from the same state space Σ.
Preservation Results
As our first main result, we show that crash-recovery versions of algorithms produced by our wrapper preserve a wide class of safety properties. The class includes the safety properties of consensus: validity, integrity and agreement (Section 3). In other words, if a trace of a crash-recovery version of an algorithm violates a property, then some crash-stop trace of the same algorithm also violates that property. We show this in the non-probabilistic crash-recovery model. However, the result also translates to the probabilistic model, since all allowed traces of the probabilistic model are also traces of the non-probabilistic one. Preserving all safety properties for all algorithms and failure detectors would be too strong of a requirement, for two reasons. First, as our crash-recovery model assumes nothing about link or process reliability, in finite runs we can give no guarantees about the accuracy of the simulated failure detectors. Second, the crash-recovery model is synchronous, meaning that different processes take steps simultaneously. This is impossible in the crash-stop model, which is asynchronous. Thus, the following simple safety property OneChanges defined by "the local state of at most one process changes between two successive states in a trace" holds in the crash-stop model, but not in the crash-recovery model (equivalently, we can find a crash-recovery trace, but not a crash-stop trace that violates the property).
We work around the first problem by assuming that the crash-stop algorithms use unreliable failure detectors. For the second problem, we restrict the class of safety properties that we wish to preserve as follows. Consider a property P . Let u / ∈ P and w be runs with the same initial states (i.e., u(1) = w(1)) such that u is a subword of w (recall we define subwords earlier). P then belongs to the class of properties not repairable through detours if w / ∈ P for all such u and w. Intuitively, this means that the sequence of states represented by u inherently violates P ; so adding "detours" by the means of additional intermediate states (forming w) does not help satisfy P .
The property OneChanges is an example of a safety property that is repairable through detours: we can take any word that violates OneChanges and extend it to a word that does not violate OneChanges. However, we can easily show that the following safety properties are not repairable through detours:
The safety properties of consensus. E.g., consider the validity property: given a word u such that v = u(i, p).dec is a non-initial and a non-⊥ value, adding further states between the initial state and u(i) does not change the fact that v is neither initial nor ⊥. State invariant properties, defined by a set S of "good" states, such that for a trace u, u ∈ Inv(S) only if ∀i. u(i) ∈ S. Equivalently, these properties rule out traces which reach the "bad" states in the complement of S. Intuitively, if a bad state is reached, we cannot fix it by adding more states before or after the bad state. We establish the following lemma, which is essential to the ensuing preservation theorem.
Lemma 2 (Crash-recovery traces have crash-stop superwords). Let A be a crash-stop algorithm with an unreliable failure detector. Let ρ R be a finite run of the crash-recovery wrapper A R . Then, there exists a finite run ρ of A such that tr(ρ R ) is a subword of tr(ρ), tr(ρ R )(1) = tr(ρ)(1), last(tr(ρ)) = last(tr(ρ R )), no processes fail in ρ, and in-flight messages of last(ρ) match the messages in the buffers of last(ρ R ).
Theorem 3 (Preservation of detour-irreparable safety properties). Let A be a crash-stop algorithm with an unreliable failure detector, and let P be a safety state property that is not repairable through detours. If A satisfies P , then so does
Proof. We prove the theorem's statement by proving its contrapositive. Assume A R violates P . By the definition of safety properties [4] , there exists a finite run ρ R of A R such that no continuation of tr(ρ R ) is in P . By Lemma 2, there exists a run ρ of A such that tr(ρ R ) is a subword of tr(ρ). By Lemma 1, ρ can be extended to an infinite run ρ · w of A. By the choice of ρ R , we have that tr(ρ R ) · tr(w) / ∈ P . As tr(ρ R ) · tr(w) is a subword of tr(ρ · w), and since P is not detour repairable, then also tr(ρ · w) / ∈ P . Thus, A also violates P .
Proving that the safety properties of consensus are detour-irrepairable, means that these properties are preserved by our wrapper. Since state invariants are also detour-irreparable, they too are preserved by our wrapper. This makes our wrapper potentially useful for reusing other kinds of crash-stop algorithms in a crash-recovery setting, not just the consensus ones. 
Corollary 4. If
Probabilistic Termination
Termination of consensus algorithms depends on stable periods, during which communication is reliable and no crashes or recoveries occur. In this section, we first state a general result about so-called selective stable periods for our probabilistic crash-recovery model. We then define a generic class of crash-stop consensus algorithms, which we call bounded algorithms. We prove that termination for these algorithms is guaranteed in our probabilistic model when run under the wrapper. Namely, we prove that, with probability 1, all processes eventually decide. We also show that the class of bounded algorithms covers a wide spectrum of existing algorithms including the celebrated Chandra-Toueg [8] and the instantiation of the indulgent framework of [20] that uses failure detectors.
Selective Stable Periods
Similar to [11] , our proofs will rely on forming strongly-connected communication components between particular sets of processes. However, we will require their existence only for bounded periods of time, which we call selective stable periods. Such selective stable periods must occur in runs of a crash-recovery algorithm A R .
Lemma 7 (Selective stable periods are mandatory). Fix a crash-recovery algorithm A R , a positive integer ∆ and a selection function sel
: C R → 2 Π ,
mapping crash-recovery configurations to process sets. Then, the set of crash-recovery runs
, has a probability of 0.
The next section shows how our wrapper exploits such periods to construct crash-recovery algorithms from existing crash-stop ones in a blackbox manner. For future work it might also be interesting to devise consensus algorithm directly on top of this property.
Bounded Algorithms
We next define the class of bounded crash-stop algorithms for which our wrapper guarantees termination in the crash-recovery setting. This class comprises algorithms which operate in rounds, with an upper bound on the number of messages exchanged per round as well the number of rounds correct processes can be apart. More formally, they are defined as follows.
Definition 8 (Bounded algorithms).
A crash-stop consensus algorithm (using reliable links and a failure detector [8] ) is said to be bounded if it satisfies all properties below: (B1) Communication-closed rounds: processes operate in rounds. The rounds must be communication-closed [14] : only the messages from the current round are considered. We can check that an algorithm satisfies property (i) B4 by checking under what condition(s) a process increments its round number, and (ii) B5 by observing the algorithm's termination under perfect failure detection given a quorum of correct processes. Section 6.3 shows an example of how to check that properties B4 and B5 hold. Using this definition, we can prove that bounded algorithms terminate in selective stable periods of sufficient length. Proof. We partition the processes from C into the set A (initially C) and NA (initially ∅). The processes in A will advance their rounds further, and the processes in NA will not advance, but will have already decided. Let p be some slowest process from A in c. We first claim that p advances or decides in any selective stable period for c and C of length at most B slow , defined as B slow = B s · B ∆ + 1. Denote the period configurations by c = c 0 , c 1 , . . .. Then, using Lemma 2, we obtain a crash-stop configuration c s 1 from c 1 that satisfies the conditions of bounded termination, with the processes from C being correct, and the others faulty. We consider two cases.
Theorem 9 (Bounded selective stable period termination). Let A be a bounded algorithm and A R its wrapped crash-recovery version. Let c be a reachable crash-recovery configuration of the
First, if p advances in the crash-stop model after receiving all the in-flight round messages in c s 1 from other processes in A, then it also advances in the crash-recovery model after receiving these messages. Moreover, our wrapper delivers all such messages within B s · B ∆ steps, as (1) it uses LIFO buffers; (2) bounds B ∆ and B s apply to c s 1 by (B3) and (B4); and (3) by Lemma 2, the same bounds also apply to c 1 .
Second, if p does not advance in the crash-stop model, then, since the failure detector output remains stable, and since no further round messages will be delivered to p in the crash-stop model, the requirement (B2) ensures that p will not advance further in the crashstop setting. Moreover, requirements (B5) and (B2) ensure that p must decide after receiving all of its round messages; we move p to the set NA.
We have thus established that the slowest process from A can move to either NA or advance its round after B slow steps. Next, we claim that we can repeat this procedure by picking the slowest member of A again. This is because the procedure ensures that the processes in NA always have round numbers lower than the processes in A. Thus, due to (B1) and (B2), the processes in A cannot rely on those from NA for changing their state.
Lastly, we note that this procedure needs to be repeated at most B iter = N · (B ∆ + B adv ) times before all processes move to the round r max (c) + B adv , by which point (B5) guarantees that all processes terminate. Thus B slow · B iter gives us the required bound B.
The main result of this paper shows that the wrapper guarantees all consensus properties for wrapped bounded algorithms, including termination.
Theorem 10 (CR consensus preservation). If a bounded algorithm A solves consensus in the crash-stop setting, then A
R also solves consensus in the probabilistic crash-recovery setting.
Proof. By Corollary 4, we conclude that A R solves the safety properties of consensus in the crash-recovery setting. For (probabilistic) termination, the result follows from Theorem 9 and Lemma 7, using as the selection function for Lemma 7 (1) any function that selects some N c fastest processes in a configuration if no process has decided yet and (2) all processes, if some process has decided. The latter allows us to propagate the decision to all processes, due to short-circuiting in A R .
Examples of Bounded Algorithms
We next give two prominent examples of bounded algorithms: the Chandra-Toueg (CT) algorithm [8] , processes only advance to the next round (which consists of two phases) when they receive messages from N c other processes. Thus, B ∆ = 2. Finally, proving the requirement (B5) is similar to, but simpler than the original termination proofs for the algorithms, since it only requires termination under conditions which includes perfect failure detector output. For space reasons, we do not provide the full proofs here, but we note that B adv = phases · N/2 for both algorithms, where phases is the number of phases per algorithm round. Intuitively, within this many rounds the execution hits a round where a correct processor is the coordinator; since we assume perfect failure detection for this period, no process will suspect this coordinator, and thus no process will move out of this round without deciding. [8] and the instantiation of the indulgent framework of [20] using failure detectors solve consensus in the probabilistic crash-recovery model.
Corollary 11. The wrapped versions of Chandra-Toueg's algorithm
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Concluding Remarks
This paper introduced new system models that closely capture the messy reality of distributed systems. Unlike the usual distributed computing models, we account for failure and recovery patterns of processes and links in a probabilistic and temporary, rather than a deterministic and perpetual manner. Our models allow an unbounded number of processes and communication links to probabilistically fail and recover, potentially for an infinite number of times. We showed how and under what conditions we can reuse existing crash-stop distributed algorithms in our crash-recovery systems. We presented a wrapper that allows crash-stop algorithms to be deployed unchanged in our crash-recovery models. The wrapper preserves the correctness of a wide class of consensus algorithms. Our work opens several new directions for future investigations. First, we currently model failures of processes as well as communication links individually and independently, with a non-zero probability of failing/recovering at any point in time. In Appendix D, we sketch how our results can be extended to systems where some processes may never even recover from failure. It is interesting to investigate what results can be established with more complicated probability distributions, e.g., if the model is weakened to allow processes and links to fail/recover on average with some non-zero probability [15] . Second, our wrapper fully persists the processes state. Studying how to minimize the amount of persisted state while still allowing our results (or similar ones) to hold is another promising direction. Finally, we focus on algorithms that depend on the reliability of message delivery. Some algorithms, notably Paxos [23], do not. Finding a modular link abstraction for the crash-stop setting that identifies these algorithms is another interesting topic. For those algorithms, we speculate that preserving termination in the crash-recovery model is simpler.
A Wrapper Description
In this section we provide the formal description of the wrapper that produces the crashrecovery version A R of a crash-stop algorithm A. The message and local state spaces are denoted by M R and Σ R p respectively. The message space of A R is defined as
M is the message set of A which we extend with a special heartbeat message hb being sent when no message needs to be sent. The second part of each message represents an acknowledgment, confirming the receipt of the last message on the channel in the opposite direction. The m ∅ message indicates that no messages (including acknowledgment messages) have been received so far.
The types of the components (st, buff, acks) of a record s ∈ Σ R p are st of type Σ p storing the state of p in the target crash-stop algorithm. buff of type Π → M * , where we recall that M * stands for the set of finite sequences of messages from M. These are p's outgoing message buffers, with one buffer for each process in the system (including one for p). acks of type Π → (M ∪ {m ∅ }). This records, for each process q, the last message that p received from q (if any). This will be used for acknowledgments. Given a crash-recovery state s, a process p, and the partial function rmsgs : Π → M R of messages received by p in the given round, we define the p's local step unfolding for s and rmsgs, written unfold(p, s, rmsgs) as follows. First, let: m q be rmsgs(q) if q ∈ dom(rmsgs), and let m q be ⊥ otherwise. That is, m q is the message from q that p receives, using ⊥ to indicate that no message was received. Let fdo = {q | m q = ⊥}. That is, all processes from whom no message was received in this step are suspected. 
B Markov chains
Our probabilistic crash-recovery model uses Markov chains [6] . We recall the basic notions here which are relevant for our proofs. A (discrete-time) Markov chain is a tuple (S, P, ι) where: S is a countable, non-empty set of states P : S × S → [0, 1] is the transition probability function such that for all states s:
For a Markov chain, the cylinder set spanned by a finite word u over S is defined as the set: Cyl(u) = {u · v | v is an infinite word over S} . These sets serve as the basis events of the σ-algebras of Markov chains.
C Omitted Proofs
C.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Informally, we obtain ρ by unfolding the crash-recovery steps of ρ R . In other words, we extend each crash-recovery step to its corresponding crash-stop steps. Recall that a single step in the crash recovery setting may abstract the receipt of multiple messages, while every received message in the crash-stop setting is step of the algorithm.
The only difficulty is handling process recovery, which does not exist in the crash-stop system. Here, we exploit the fact that, in asynchronous systems, crashed processes are indistinguishable from delayed ones. This enables us to keep ρ free from failed processes.
We now state our claim more formally, and then prove it by induction. We claim that there exists a finite run ρ such that: 
Here, we overload ∈, writing m ∈ buff even though buff is a sequence.
Proving the base case is easy, as ρ R (1).s.st is an initial state of A, and both the in-flight set of messages M and all the buffers are empty for initial configurations (follows from our wrapper's definition).
We now prove the step case. Let ρ R and ρ be as above, let:
, and ρ R be the extension of ρ R with (c R , l R , c R ). In other words, c R , is a next "letter" we could add to a valid run of A R . Thus, we will prove that we can extend ρ with a series of transitions, to obtain a run ρ such that the claim holds for ρ R and ρ . The extension is obtained by concatenating the unfoldings of each process's local step. More precisely, we define the sequences (fragments) fr 0 . . . fr N where fr i is the unfolding of process i's local steps: and we let c = last(ρ ). It is easy to check that the definition of unfold and the correspondence we establish between the buffers ensure that ρ is a (finite) run of A. Finally, we show the claim:
Hence, c R .s.st = c .s, and given the inductive hypothesis, we conclude that tr(ρ R ) is a subword of tr(ρ ), and (P1) holds. ρ (i).F = ∅ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ |ρ |. Thus, (P2) holds.
C.2 Proof of Corollary 4
We first prove that each of the safety properties of consensus is a detour-irrepairable safety property. The rest follows directly from Theorem 3.
1.
Validity: Consider a word w such that w(i, p).dec = x, where x = ⊥ ∧ x = w (1, q a word w such that w(i, p).dec = x and w(i , p) .dec = x , where x = ⊥, i > i and x = x. Adding further states between w(1), w(i) and w(i ) results in word w where ∃j ≥ j ≥ i : w (j, p).dec = x ∧ w (j , p).dec = x and w (1, q).inp = w (1, q) .inp, ∀q. Thus, adding further states does not change the fact that x is neither ⊥ nor that x = x and hence integrity is detour-irreparable. Thus, adding further states does not change the fact that two different processes p and q have decided x = ⊥ and x = ⊥ x respectively, where x = x . This shows that agreement is detour-irreparable.
C.3 Proof of Lemma 7
We first prove two auxiliary results. N −|C| . Note that for i ≥ 1, given c i , c i+1 is unique, since the algorithm is deterministic and since we require that all messages between processes in C go through (rmsgs is defined). From the definition of trans, we can easily deduce P (c i , c i+1 ) > 
Lemma 12 (Selective recovery always possible). For any crash-recovery algorithm
XX:22 You Only Live Multiple Times
Finally, we prove Lemma 7. 
D A nastier probabilistic environment
In the probabilistic model described in Section 3.3, we required the probabilistic failure pattern F P to assign to all processes a positive probability of being up at all times. This allows us to form arbitrary stable components for bounded lengths of time. Here, we define a more difficult setting, where some processes can fail forever. However, the number of the remaining processes must be large enough to allow termination. We thus change the condition on the failure pattern from Section 3.3 as follows. We require that there exists a set C of (intuitively "correct") processes such that:
there exists an F > 0 such that ∀p ∈ C. ∀t. F P (p, t) ∈ ( F , 1 − F ) |C| > N − N f for all processes p / ∈ C, there exist only a finite number of values t such that F P (p, t) > 0. The third restriction allows us to eventually form a bounded stable period with a strongly connected component of correct processes. Without it, we could have a process whose probability of being up is oscillating between 0 and 1. Clearly, in a setting where only one process has a probability of 1, and all others of 0 at all times, termination is impossible.
As this definition still does not add any runs to the system that did not exist in the non-probabilistic environment, all results from Section 5 still hold. We next sketch how our definition of bounded algorithms and our proofs need to change to preserve the termination result in this more adversarial setting. First, note that the specification of termination has to change in this setting; as processes not from C can crash forever, we cannot require them to terminate.
Intuitively, consider the point in time in a crash-stop run after which all faulty processes have already crashed. Faulty processes in this context are those processes that crash permanently, i.e. not in the set C above. A corresponding run in the crash-recovery system would be in some state where the processes from C can recover with positive probability, with processes being at different rounds. Our system now can be seen similar to our probabilistic model described in Section 3.3, but now started from a different set of possible initial states. We need to adapt our bounded round gap property (B4) to account for this difference. Namely, we change it to require the bound to hold for any configuration where all the faulty processes have crashed, and where we no longer assume that the fastest processes are correct. The bound is dynamic, in that it can depend on the given configuration. The bounded termination requirement (B5) also changes in a similar way; we no longer assume that the fastest processes are correct, but that all the faulty processes have already crashed. However, we do not need to make the bound B adv dynamic.
With these modifications, we can reuse the proof of Theorem 9 to show that non-faulty processes of this nastier model decide, and hence terminate.
